Recently, I was asked an interesting question related to the proof of the existence of God. This is commonly known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument in Western thought, so this article assumes that you already know what it is.
As a very short summary, one way of putting the argument is that everything that is contingent must have a cause. The universe is contingent, therefore it must have a cause. This conclusion leads to the conclusion that the cause must be necessary, because if the cause was also contingent, then we’d have an impossible infinite regress of the same question.
The minor premise, that the universe is contingent is proven by the argument that it is composed of bodies and accidents, which are both contingent, as known through observation. The mutakallimun expound upon this argument in incredible detail and go to incredible lengths to show the rational basis of the argument, but at first glance, a question might arise:
On the universe being composed of ajsam (bodies) and continuously changing a'rad (accidents), isn't this something we know by demonstrable, repetitive observations, and therefore only ghalibatul dhann (near-certainty) and not yaqeen (full certainty)?
This is a great question. In other words, the question is asking that since we know the universe by way of experiencing it and observing it, which does not always give absolute certainty, then how can we say that the argument for the existence of God based on these observations can give absolute certainty? If the premise is not giving certainty, then how can the conclusion certain?
The scholars of Kalam answer this question in great detail, and I’ve summarized it here.
Some changes in a’raad are known by observation, but the observation here is not a hukm ‘aadi, it is a hukm aqli using a premise established by an observation.
In other words, if we didn’t have eyes, we wouldn’t know that things have color.
But since we do have eyes, we know that color exists, so we can use the intellect to make judgements about color.
This is called a wajib muqayyad (conditionally necessary). An example of this would be us saying that anything that is physical takes up space.
It’s not a rational necessity for a physical thing to exist, but if it DOES exist, we can deem it rationally necessary for that physical thing to take up space based off our grasp of what a physical thing is.
As for the other question, about the universe being confined to jawahir (bodies) and a’raad (Accidents), it’s also an excellent question too and one discussed by the mutakallimun.
The neoplatonists and others affirmed the existence of contingent things that were neither physical nor attributes, but there is no proof or very very weak arguments on their existences.
When it comes to inductive reasoning using observation, even if there is a hypothetical third category that we have not considered, we wouldn’t need to address it until someone properly proved that it existed in the first place. So a hypothetical non-‘Arad, non-jism wouldn’t harm our proposition.
As for abstract concepts, they don’t need to “live” anywhere.
There’s no “pure chair” or “pure love” concept that lives in a theoretical realm.
Chair 1 and Chair 2 and Chair 3 in the real world all share in the fact that they are a chair, but that doesn’t necessitate that there has to be a pure chair entity that they’re being instantiated from. All it means is that we observed a shared pattern (a piece of furniture that is sat on), gave it the name “chair”, and when we see an object that fits the definition of being a piece of furniture that is sat on, we call it a chair.
The questioner may then ask, is it possible to know a wajib muqayyid with yaqeen (certainty), or only ghalibatul dhann (near certainty)? For example, before we went into space, would "things fall to the ground" be a valid wajib muqayyid?
The answer is that things falling to the ground was never a Wajib muqayyad. It was always considered jaiz aqlan (rationally possible). Something conditionally necessary is like “a father must have a son.” That’s because the definition of a father is literally someone who has a son. A father doesn’t have to exist, but if he were to exist, he would have a son.
And Allah knows best.